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Abstract 
The paper establishes a relationship between supervisionand survivability of banks. The study employs EVIEW 
statistical software using the two stage least square method to evaluate a set of factors which affect bank 
survivability. Data for the study were extracted from the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) statistical bulletin and 
bureau of statistics publications (1981 – 2013). The results confirm positive significant relationship 
amongcapital protection, earnings strength and bank liquidity while cash reserve ratio and bank strength had 
negative impact on bank liquidity. These variables were found to be inelastic due to time lag banks may take to 
adjust to supervision patterns, reforms and finding alternatives. A short time frame given by the supervisory 
authority to implement a new regulation by banks resulted to inelastic bank liquidity. The strength-supervision 
model showed positive significant relationship among bank liquidity, asset quality and bank strength. The 
supervisory authority as a watch dog cannot be an umpire and a player,but rather would prefer giving a fitting 
burial to banks that have failedrather than jeopardize the whole system. It is therefore worthwhile to devote 
considerable resources to the establishment of effective supervision and inspection. 
Keywords:  Bank supervision, Bank liquidity, Bank strength, cash reserve ratio, earnings strength. 
 
1. Introduction 
One principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote monetary stability and soundness in the financial 
system. To achieve this, monetary authority must improve the regulatory processes and pursue policies and 
standards that would enhance the safety, soundness and efficiency of the financial system. 
Supervision entails not only the enforcement of rules and regulations, but also some judgment regarding the 
quality of financial institutions assets (bank strength). Instability in the banking sector could lead to bank 
failures, loss of public confidence, as well as adverse macroeconomic environment with negative impact on real 
income, employment and output (Keeley:1990) The major source of bank funding is deposits. Hence depositors 
need protection, primarily because they do not have the means to determine the extent of risks taken by banks in 
the use of their money. The supervisory and regulatory framework must therefore ensure that banks operate 
within prescribed prudential limits and standards in a safe manner and uphold high standards of professional 
conduct that would sustain continuing confidence in the banking system (Estrella:1998) 
 
The banking industry has become very dynamic. This more competitive and dynamic environment may not be 
compatible with traditional regulatory structures. The key question is how to adapt the supervisory framework to 
the increasing competitive environment of banking. In a less orthodox terminology: how do we regulate and 
supervise a moving target? 
One of the operational requirementsof supervision and inspection is the analysis of bank survivability (bank 
strength and bank liquidity). 
 
Against this backdrop the paper represents among others an effort to establish the relationship between bank 
survivability and central banks pattern of supervision in order to provide a framework for improvement in the 
process. 
2. Synopsis of related and empirical literature 
The overriding objective of CBN’s financial sector surveillance function is to promote stability and soundness 
that would engender public confidence in the system (CBN Brief: 2008-2009 editions). Pointedly, Imala (2004) 
explicates that a poorly regulated financial sector or one with insufficient capital for the risks it takes, can 
increase a country’s vulnerability to financial crisis.  
Glenn Tasky (2008) noted that bank supervision aims at a single comprehensive informed opinion about the 
condition and performance of a bank and taking appropriate actions. Oni (2004) perceived bank supervision 
purpose as ascertaining that affairs of  banks are conducted in a safe and sound manner with respect 
to:Adequacy of capital, Asset quality, Board of management, Earnings, Liquidity, Adequacy of internal 
control, Adequacy of accounting system and record keeping, Compliance with both individual bank’s 
internal policies and prudential regulations. 
Bank examination focuses on six components of bank safety and soundness known as CAMELS. C-capital 
protection, A- Asset quality, M-management competence, E-earnings strength, L-liquidity risk exposure S- 
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Sensitivity to market risk.Rationale for supervising and regulating the financial system concerns stability, 
meaning the ability of financial markets and institutions or intermediaries to provide the time key services-risk 
sharing, liquidity and information in face of economic disturbances. Second, most financial assets are held by 
banks. Lastly, government can advance economic policy by interacting with the financial sector. Actions of the 
central bank for example affect the banking system and promote monetary policy. 
Bank supervision does not prevent failure, as CBN cannot play the role of an umpire and a player. Survival is the 
responsibility of the board and management of a bank (Frederick: 2000).  
2.1The pattern of bank supervision 
Schematically, Charles (2004) explicates the current regulatory and supervisory framework for Nigerian 
financial institutions with information on table 1. The supervisory function is played by Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) and Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) complementing. NDIC acts as a financial safety net 
in the regulation of the banking system. 
Bank supervision has two broad divisions namely onsite and offsite (see table 2). CBN Banking supervision 
department carry out onsite supervision. This involves essentially the appraisal of banks return. Offsite 
surveillance serves as “early warning device” accomplished by analyzing key bank financial ratios and other 
financial data generated from periodic financial reports submitted to the supervisors.  EFASS is the module 
through which banks send rendition reports to CBN (50 years of central banking 2009:33). The returns look at 
interest rate, spread, margins, capital adequacy, and liquidity ratio. 
 
Table 1: Current regulatory and supervisory framework for Nigeria's financial institutions 
Type of institution Legal framework Licensed by Supervised by Examined by Insured by 
Bank CBN act 1991Bofia 
act 1998 CAMA 
1990 
CBN CBN and NDIC CBN and NDIC NDIC 
Other non-bank 
financial 
institution 
CBN act 1991 and 
Bofia act 1991 
CBN CBN CBN --- 
Capital market 
operators 
SEC act 1979 
CAMA 1990 
SEC SEC SEC --- 
Insurance 
companies 
CAMA 1990 
And Insurance act 
1992 
NAICOM NAICOM NAICOM ---- 
Source: CBN Bullion vol. 28 No. 1 January-March 2004, pp 28. 
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 Onsite supervision entails physical visits to banks for on the-spot review of bank records by CBN bank 
examination department. Onsite examination includes maiden examination, routine examination, target/special 
examination, investigation/spot checks aimed at determining risk exposure, with emphasis on capital, asset 
quality, strength of earnings and adequacy of liquidity. Routine checks are based on the returns received from 
banks. Routine examination examines corporate governance issues, ethics, capital adequacy issues, liquidity 
requirement, credit policies/insider credit, and single obligor limits. 
Bank supervision is team based. Unlike the former ad hoc team arrangement to visit banks,the new arrangement 
is permanent team designated to particular banks. In aggregate there are eight teams. The essence is for each 
team to study, know specifics, and have in-depth knowledge of banks assigned to them. This forestalls haphazard 
supervision, leading to continuity in examination in order to be in the best average position to suggest problem 
solving options. 
General theories of government regulation provide a spontaneous framework for assessing bank supervision.The 
first theory, the “supervisory power view” postulates that strong official supervision of banks can improve their 
corporate governance. This theory holds that private agents frequently lack the incentive and capabilities to 
monitor powerful banks. It assumes that government has both the expertise and incentives to ameliorate market 
imperfections and improve the governance of banks. When information costs, transaction costs, and government 
Table 2: Pattern of Bank supervision 
Bank supervision 
Onsite Offsite 
Maiden EFASS 
Routine 
 Corporate governance 
issues 
 Ethics 
 Capital adequacy issues 
 Liquidityrequirements 
 Credit policies insider 
o Performing 
o Doubtful 
o Lost 
o Credit to watch 
 Single obligor limits 
 ownership 
Returns 
 Spread 
 Capital 
adequacy 
 Liquidity ratio 
 Interest rate 
Target/special check 
Spot check 
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policies interfere with the incentives and abilities of private agents to monitor banks, strong official supervision 
of banks can improve the corporate governance of banks (Stigler, 1971). 
An alternate theory, the “political/regulatory capture view”, argues that politicians and supervisors do not 
maximize social welfare; they instead maximize their own private welfare (Hamilton, et al., 1788; Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1962; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Thus if bank supervisory agents have the power to discipline non-
compliant banks, then politicians and supervisors may use this power to divert the flow of credit to politically 
connected firms (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Stigler, 1975; Haber et al., 2003). Under these conditions, banks do 
not only allocate capital based on risk-return criteria.  
Finally, the “private empowerment view” argues that bank supervisory policies should focus on enhancing 
the ability and incentives of private agents to overcome information and transaction costs, so that private 
investors can exert effective governance over banks. Consequently, the private empowerment view seeks to 
provide supervisors with the responsibility and authority to induce banks to disclose accurate information to 
the public, so that private agents can monitor banks more effectively (Hay and Shleifer, 1998). Thus, the 
private empowerment view holds that corruption of bank officials will be less of a constraint on corporate 
finance in countries that foster public information disclosure and have well-functioning legal institutions 
than in countries that rely on powerful official supervisors. 
Dissatisfaction with the old risk-based capital requirement led to a new theory emphasizing market discipline. 
The “market discipline view” by William et al (2001) postulates that financial market discipline preserves bank 
safety and soundness by helping supervisors directly penalize undue risk. 
Philip and Ugochi (2003) explored the relationship between risk indicators for individual banks and the different 
approaches to banking supervision adopted around the world. They carried out empirical investigations in a 
panel data framework and found wide-ranging effects of design features of banking supervision on risk taking 
which raise important policy issues. Thierry and thiery (1990) writing on Optimal Prudential Regulation of 
Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision, considered how  moral hazard economy in banks and how 
incentives forrisk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. Their results showed that low interest rates 
maygenerate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibriummay not be 
optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. 
3.Methodology 
The duration consideration, along military and democratic dispensation policies differential was cushioned with 
the assumption that duration is considered as being continuous (Davidson and Mackinon, 2004) 
The population is finite but composed of all banks operated in Nigerian banking industry. The data of study is 
extracted from CBN statistical bulletin and bureau of statistics publications. The sample size for analysis was 
done judgmentally,but encompasses times of major reforms ranging for a period of 31 years from 1981 to 2013. 
The data analysis techniqueis the econometric procedure applying the two stage least square (TSLS) method. 
 
Towards achieving the research aforementioned objectives a structural model was estimated. Functionally stated 
as: 
BL = a0 + a1ES +a2InCA + a3InCRR + a4BS + u1……………………………………………1 
BS = b0 + b1SEN +b2AQ + b3BL + u2……………………………………………2 
Where: 
BL – bank liquidity risk exposure AQ – asset quality or loan quality 
BS – bank strength CA – capital protection/adequacy 
ES – earnings strength  
MD – market discipline SEN – sensitivity to market risk 
Bank liquidity risk exposure is proxied by the loan deposit ratio.  
The bank strength is proxied by the total commercial banks assets. Because it could be conjectured that when the 
base of banks is strong the banks would be able to meet their obligations and hence the better the possibility of 
survival (Egwakhe and Osabuohien: 2009). In addition Soludo (2006) Observed that the total asset of Nigeria 
commercial banks increased by 79.7% between 2003 and 2006 even though the number of banks drastically 
reduced from 90 to 25 within the same period. Thus the use of banks total asset as a measure of their strength 
appears better than the number of banks. 
Earning strength is proxied by the ratio of banks loan to their total asset. The logarithm to base ewas added to 
capital protection and cash reserve ratio as they increase more slowly than bank liquidity, perhaps giving 
credence to Engels law. 
Banks sensitivity to market risk as a measure of relative risk measurement tool is measured using the capital 
asset pricing model beta coefficient and risk exposure that is: b(Km-Rf) 
Where  
b = beta coefficient  Km – Rf  = Risk exposure  b(km-RF)  = b1SEN 
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Asset quality as a measurement of the credit risk associated with it is proxied as the lumpsum of banks claim on 
the central government as such loans have high quality. 
The cash reserve ratio as a proxy for market discipline. Implies for commercial banks to play fair they need to 
stay by the rules or discipline of the market in which they exist. 
The stochastic error term encompasses vagueness of theory, intrinsic randomness, and behavioral culture of 
individual banks and principle of parsimony. 
The table array for variables needed for this analysis is presented at appendix A Table 7. The reduced form and 
identification of the structural equation is presented at appendix B. Sufficiently shows that equation (1) and (2) 
are over identified.  
3.1 Unit root test 
A series is stationary if it has mean reversion { E(yt)  = μ}, variance  are constant over time { Var (Yt)  = δ2} and 
if the covariance  between two values  from the series depends only on the length of time separating the  two 
values, not on the actual times at which the variables are observed Cov(Yt, Yt + s ) =   Cov (Yt, Yt - s )   =  Ys  
(covariance  = f (s not t). The results of the three standard tests for unit roots in the variables of the model are 
reported in table 3.The table shows that the variables are stationary only at first difference. 
Table 3:  the unit root test statistics 
 ADF test statistic Phillips-perron Kwiatkowski-
phillips-schmidt-shin 
V
a
ri
a
bl
es
 1st difference 1st difference 1st difference 
No intercept and 
no trend 
With Intercept and 
no trend 
No intercept 
and no trend 
With Intercept 
and no trend 
With Intercept and no 
trend 
BL -5.485703 *  -5.485775*  0.104224**** 
ES -5.571479*  -5.686520*  0.377844**** 
InCA -4.981131*  -4.981131*  0.149591**** 
BS  -3.600082*****    
InCRR -3.202747***  -4.934944*  0.113857**** 
SEN -5.793554*  -6.051956*  0.153912**** 
AQ    -5.549859* 0.254233**** 
* Significant at 5% level. ADF and Phillips-perron critical value at first difference without intercept and trend = 
-1.952066. 
** Significant at 5% level. ADF critical value at level with intercept and trend = -3.603202. 
*** Significant at 5% level. ADF critical value at first difference without intercept and trend = -1.953858 
**** Significant at 5% level. Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-shin at first difference with intercept and no trend 
=  0.463000 
***** Significant at 5% level. ADF at first difference with intercept and no trend =  -2.998064 
 
3.2 Cointegration 
Table 4 presents results of the Johansen cointegration tests for the liquidity-strength-supervision model. Shows 
that the variables are cointegrated as indicated by trace and eigenvalue statistic greater than the critical value at 
5% level. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.12, 2015 
 
245 
Table 4: johansen cointegration test result 
For Liquidity-supervision model 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.760686  99.92257  76.97277  0.0003 
At most 1 *  0.561633  55.59320  54.07904  0.0364 
At most 2  0.483700  30.02755  35.19275  0.1622 
At most 3  0.188919  9.534469  20.26184  0.6853 
At most 4  0.093511  3.043475  9.164546  0.5726 
     
     Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.760686  44.32937  34.80587  0.0027 
At most 1  0.561633  25.56565  28.58808  0.1160 
At most 2  0.483700  20.49308  22.29962  0.0876 
At most 3  0.188919  6.490994  15.89210  0.7310 
At most 4  0.093511  3.043475  9.164546  0.5726 
     
     
For strength-supervision model 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.873012  107.6140  54.07904  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.614011  43.64058  35.19275  0.0049 
At most 2  0.312168  14.13025  20.26184  0.2805 
At most 3  0.078363  2.529732  9.164546  0.6716 
     
     
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.873012  63.97344  28.58808  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.614011  29.51033  22.29962  0.0041 
At most 2  0.312168  11.60052  15.89210  0.2104 
At most 3  0.078363  2.529732  9.164546  0.6716 
     
     
 
3.3 Simultaneity test  
Table 5: test for simultaneity, exogeneity and endogeneity 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
V1 -27488.31 46824.95 -0.587044 0.5621 
V2 -4.75E-07 8.15E-07 -0.583209 0.5648 
From the liquidity-supervision model perspective Simultaneity problem does not exist.  The endogenous 
regressors are mutually independent. Same conclusion is reached from the strength-supervision model 
perspective. 
3.4 Exogeneity test  
The endogenous regressors in the liquidity-supervision model are truly exogenous with disturbance of the 
reduced form (-0.587044) being insignificant at 5%. The endogenous regressors are not correlated with the 
disturbances using ols estimator is not biased and inconsistent. The estimators will converge to the true values or 
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zero. Using IV its estimators will be consistent but not efficient (i.e. smaller variance) while OLS estimators are 
consistent and efficient. Same conclusion is reached from the strength-supervision model perspective. 
3.5 Endogeneity test  
From the liquidity-supervision model perspective the endogenous regressors are not truly endogenous at 5% as 
the p-value was above it by 0.5571. OLS estimators performs better here than IV estimators. Same conclusion is 
reached from the strength-supervision model perspective. 
3.6 Weak instrument diagnostic  
Using canonical correlation to test whether any relationship between the instruments and the endogenous 
variables is sufficiently strong for reliable econometric inferences. 
Cragg-donald F= [(N-G-B)/L]*[r2B/(1- r2B)] 
Where N denote the sample size, B the number of RHS endogenous variables, G the number of exogenous 
variables included in the equation (including the intercept), L the number of “external” instruments that are not 
included in the model, and rB the minimum canonical correlation. 
The first equation under maximum relative bias is not available for models with less than 3 instruments. While 
based on the maximum test size criterion at stock-yugo critical value of 10%and L=2 instumental variables. The 
instruments are strong as cragg-donald (225.1847) is greater than stock-yugo (19.93). The second equation under 
maximum relative bias size at 10% and L=3 instumental variables, The instruments are strong as cragg-donald 
(9.467803) is greater than stock-yugo (9.08) 
3.7 Regression results and interpretation  
Table 6: Regression result 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
t-
Statistic Prob.   
Dependent Variable: 
BANK_LIQUIDITY C 3.972916 9.120273 0.435614 0.6666 
Adjusted R-
squared=0.780828 LOG(CAPITAL_PROTECTION) 0.897467 0.430870 2.082919 0.0469 
F-statistic=28.70818 
LOG(CASH_RESERVE_RATIO) -6.851208 1.632030 
-
4.197967 0.0003 
Durbin-Watson 
stat=1.961306 BANK_STRENGTH -1.17E-06 1.95E-07 
-
6.007131 0.0000 
 EARNINGS_STRENGTH 224497.5 26301.20 8.535637 0.0000 
Dependent Variable: 
BANK_STRENGTH C -7861600. 3609289. 
-
2.178158 0.0380 
Adjusted R-
squared=0.947293 BANK_LIQUIDITY 108666.6 48434.77 2.243565 0.0330 
F-statistic=188.8539 
SENSITIVITY_TO_MARKET_RI -136354.4 89087.52 
-
1.530567 0.1371 
Durbin-Watson 
stat=2.324146 ASSET_QUALITY 7464.185 319.0401 23.39576 0.0000 
With cointegration confirmed for the liquidity-supervision and strength-supervision models, the long run model 
was estimated with output extract in table 6. 
Liquidity-supervision model supervision variables had expected signs and no autocorrelation between the 
disturbances as the Durbin-Watson tends to 2. The model is plausible as 78% variation in bank liquidity is 
explicated by supervision variables. Without supervision, liquidity over the period autonomously averages 
3.972916per annum absolutely. Table 6 shows significant positive association between capital protection at its 
natural log and bank liquidity.The magnitude of the capital protection at its natural log impact on bank liquidity 
is large. For an increase in the ln(capital protection) of 1percent, on average leads to about 0.0089 (constant 
semi-elasticity)percent growth rate in bank liquidity but .00265 absolutely. Deviating by 0.0711 capital adequacy 
category of banks adequately capitalized (fulfilling minimum requirement) total capital to risk-weighted assets of 
8%. The ln capital protection elasticity of bank liquidity is inelastic as epsilon 0.0128 is below 1. This may be 
due to time lag banks may take to adjust to supervision patterns and reforms and finding alternatives. A shorter 
time frame given by the supervisory authority to implement a new regulation by banks result to inelastic bank 
liquidity.Significant negative association between cash reserve ratio at its natural log and bank liquidity. The 
magnitude of the capital protection at its natural log impact on bank liquidity is large. For an increase in the 
ln(capital protection) of 1percent, on average leads to about 6.8512 (constant semi-elasticity)percent anti-growth 
rate in bank liquidity but 1.0889 absolutely. Cash reserve ratio serve as threat or discipline to liquidity 
management and risk exposure. The ln cash reserve ratio elasticity of bank liquidity is inelastic as epsilon 0.0976 
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is below 1. This may be due to time lag banks may take to adjust to supervision patterns and reforms and finding 
alternatives. The shorter the time lag for adjustment then the more inelastic bank liquidity. 
Significant negative association between bank strength and bank liquidity. Bank strength and liquidity may be 
conflicting objective requiring trade-off. For an increase in the bank strength of 1percent, on average leads to 
about 0.00000117decreases in bank liquidity absolutely.The bank strength elasticity of bank liquidity is inelastic 
as epsilon 0.071 is below 1. Bank strength impacts effectively when bank store greater proportion of strength in 
liquid asset. The converse argument leads to inelastic bank liquidity.Significant positive association between 
earnings strength and bank liquidity. The magnitude of the bank strength impact on bank liquidity is large. For 
an absolute increase in the bank strength of 1percent, on average leads to about 224497.8increases in bank 
liquidity absolutely. The earnings strength elasticity of bank liquidity is elastic as epsilon 1.1293 is above 1. This 
may be due to emphasis of profit as a measure of management performance. The slower the time lag between 
bang per buck, then the more elastic bank liquidity. 
In reality macroeconomic variables are not mutually exclusive or substitutes rather the compliment another to 
have reinforcing effect. Jointly the supervision variables affect and related to bank liquidity at fisher 28.70818. 
For the Strength-supervision model, supervision variables had expected signs and no autocorrelation between the 
disturbances as the Durbin-Watson tends to 2. The model is plausible as 95% variation in bank strength is 
explicated by supervision variables. Without supervision bank strenth over the period autonomously decreaases 
by 7861600.per annum absolutely. 
Table 6 shows significant positive association between bank liquidity and bank strength. The magnitude of the 
bank liquidity impact on bank strength is large. For an increase in the bank strength of 1percent, on average leads 
to about 108666.6increases in bank strength absolutely. The bank liquidity elasticity of bank strength is elastic as 
epsilon 1.79 is above 1. This may be due to time lag banks may take to adjust to supervision patterns, reforms, 
and finding alternatives. The farther the lag then the more elastic bank strength.Significant positive association 
between asset qualityand bank strength. For an increase in the asset quality of 1percent, on average leads to 
about 7464.185 absolute change in bank strength. This may be due to high claims of banks loan on central 
government. The beta coefficient of the sensitivity to market risk is not significantly less than zero.Shows the 
higher the risk to justify the risk of investors expecting higher returns on securitieslowers the bank strength.  
In reality macroeconomic variables are not mutually exclusive or substitutes rather the compliment another to 
have reinforcing effect. Jointly the supervision variables affect and related to bank strength at fisher 
188.8539.Generally the fisher test being significant aligns with Stigler’s conclusion under the “supervisory 
power view” which postulates that strong official supervision of banks can improve their corporate governance. 
4. Policy lessons and conclusion 
Regulating and supervising a moving target is a function of a consistent and efficient scheme for supervision 
variables barring earnings strength (As each management board spontaneously gears towards higher earnings) to 
be elastic. The time lag banks may take to adjust to supervision patterns, reforms, and finding alternatives should 
be increased judiciously, the shorter the time frame given by the supervisory authority to implement a new 
regulation by banks result to inelastic bank liquidity.  
Supervision and inspection are not panacea for preventing all in banking industry. There are other measures that 
can be applied to ensure complete framework. The question is: how should the supervisory authority supervise a 
moving target? One of many ways is using moving variables. Variables that are functions of economic 
conditions at a point in time. The essence of using moving variables is that they have announcement effect, they 
are last resort tool, and they mitigate supervisory arbitrage. The supervisory authority as a watch dog cannot be 
an umpire and a player, but rather would prefer giving a fitting burial to banks that have failed than jeopardize 
the whole system. It is therefore worthwhile to devote considerable resources to the establishment of effective 
supervision and inspection. 
Finally, the small sample on which the results are based implies that the policy lessons are suggestive and 
therefore should be taken with some caution. 
 
Reference  
Becker G. and G. Stigler (1974),“Law enforcement malfeasance and the compensation of enforcers”, journal of 
legal studies 3, 1-18. 
Buchanan, J.M. and G. Tullock (1962),“The calculus of consent”, University of Michigan press. 
Central bank of Nigeria: 50 years of central banking in Nigeria (2009). 
Charles N.O. (2004), “Institutional framework for the regulation and supervision of the financial sector: CBN 
publication vol. 28 No.1 2004 pp.25”. 
Davidson, R. and Mackinon, J.G. (2004),“Econometric theory and methods”, Oxford: oxford university press. 
Egwakhe A.J. and Evans S.C.(2009),“Pakistan economic and social review volume 47, No.2 (winter 2009)”. 
Estrella, A. (1998), “Formulas for supervision? Remarks on the future of regulatory capital”, FRBNY economic 
policy review, 191-200. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.12, 2015 
 
248 
Fredrick Temple (2000),“financial institutions development project-project lense workshop”, Bangladesh. 
Glenn Tasky (2008),“publication on Jordan economic development program (SABEQ)”, USAID Gov/pdf-
des/PNADM 889.pdf USAID/Jordan economic growth office Eco June 25 2008. 
Haber et al (2003),“The politics of property rights: political instability, credible commitments and economic 
growth in Mexico” (Cambridge university press). 
Hamilton et al (1788),“federalist paper”, (Inc. possiter, Ed. New York: New American library, 1961). 
Hay J.R. and A. sheifer (1998), “Private enforcement of public laws: A theory of legal reform”, American 
economic review papers and proceedings 88, 398-403. 
Imal O.J. (2009),“The experience of banking supervision in financial sector surveillance”. 
Keeley, M.C. (1990), “Deposit insurance risk and market power in banking American economic review 80, 
1183-1201”. 
Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny (1998),“The grabbing hand: government pathologies and their cures”, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard university press. 
Soludo, C. (2006),“Nigeria financial system strategy 2020”, Plan your dream FSS 2020 international conference, 
Abuja, 18thJune. 
Strigler G (1971), “the theory of economic regulation”, Journal of economics and management science. 2, 3-21. 
Strigler G. (1975),“the citizen and the state: essays on regulation”, University of Chicago press.  
Michael O. Ndugbu: B.Sc. (Economics), MBA (Project management), M.sc/PhD (Financial management). He is 
a senior lecturer in the department of Banking and Finance, Imo State University, Owerri, Nigeria. 
Emeka Ochiabuto, B.Sc. (Banking and Finance), ACIB. 
 
Table array of exogenous and endogenous variables  
Table 7: table array of data with dependent variables (bank liquidity and strength) with predictor and 
instrumental variables (asset quality, cash resrve ratio, sensitivity to market risk, capital protection and 
earnings strength) 
year Bank 
liquidity 
(ratio) 
Asset quality 
(₦' billion) 
Bank strength 
(₦ Million) 
Cash 
reserve 
ratio (ratio) 
sensitivity to 
market risk 
capital 
protection 
(ratio) 
Earnings 
strength (ratio) 
1981 74.5 1.7739 19477.5 9.5 6.4 0.227250673 0.000423268 
1982 84.6 2.8186 22661.9 10.7 4.8 0.270171533 0.00043604 
1983 83.8 5.1404 26701.5 7.1 4.3 0.205766289 0.000384364 
1984 81.9 8.7261 30066.7 4.7 1.9 0.184872084 0.000359594 
1985 66.9 10.2549 31997.9 1.8 2.1 0.164988824 0.000366318 
1986 83.2 4.422 39678.8 1.7 1.4 0.187646857 0.000374328 
1987 72.9 7.5727 49828.4 1.4 -0.55 0.215418038 0.000348269 
1988 66.9 7.3096 58027.2 2.1 -1.05 0.209875084 0.000335379 
1989 80.4 3.614 64874 2.9 -5.8 0.218400747 0.00033681 
1990 66.5 8.7024 82957.8 2.9 -5.5 0.328889751 0.000310791 
1991 59.8 6.8135 117511.9 2.9 -4.6 360.742 0.000254368 
1992 55.2 5.8812 159190.8 4.4 -14 615.226 0.000253994 
1993 42.9 29.8468 226162.8 6 -20.4 892.83 0.000196277 
1994 60.9 39.1842 295033.2 5.7 -4.1 1053.072 0.000294584 
1995 73.3 20.7885 385141.8 5.8 -4.6 1219.782 0.000326457 
1996 72.9 47.5212 458777.5 7.5 -2.65 1422.702 0.000341624 
1997 76.6 39.6224 584375 7.8 -3.3 163.771 0.000371947 
1998 74.4 49.1424 694615.1 8.3 -6.35 173.3182 0.00035391 
1999 54.6 188.5764 1070019.8 11.7 -9.2 301.0264 0.000293617 
2000 51 278.1301 1568838.7 9.8 -4.5 420.4904 0.00027895 
2001 65.6 208.2705 2247039.3 10.8 -5.65 784.0124 0.000332248 
2002 62.8 467.5217 2766880.3 10.6 -8.08 838.0334 0.000299543 
2003 61.9 378.2045 3047856.3 10 -4.52 953.6984 0.000341038 
2004 68.6 609.0753 3753277.8 8.6 -4.31 998.545006 0.000348273 
2005 70.8 630.8482 4515117.6 9.7 2.5 27.3931968 0.000366903 
2006 63.6 993.5304108 7172932.1 2.6 1.8 32.88018602 0.000306397 
2007 70.8 1960.407759 10981693.6 2.8 -1.61 30.9490423 0.000359814 
2008 80.9 1717.149882 15919559.8 3.0 -0.1 41.48464974 0.000390429 
2009 85.7 1826.681096 17522858.2 1.3 0.67 23.4134904 0.000449066 
2010 74.2 2377.945278 17331559 1.0 -4.45 24.99302615 0.000395317 
2011 44.8 3162.43154 19396633.8 8.0 -12.78 48.66579994 0.000347444 
2012 42.3 2527.449458 21288144.4 12 -11.97 73.11425511 0.000364916 
2013 36.3 2655.662946 22361800 12 -8.47 126.7215062 0.000428996 
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Source: CBN statistical bulletin and bureau of statistics, December 2013 
Note  Ratio  
Bank liquidity  Loan to deposit ratio  Measure the liquidity exposure risk of 
Nigeria banks  
Asset quality  Claims on central government 
=treasury bills  + treasury certificate  + 
development stocks  + loans and 
advances to central government  
Is an evaluation of asset to measure 
the credit risk associated  with it 
Capital adequacy  Prior to 1990 calculated as =    
adjusted capital 
Total loans and advances outstanding 
from 1991 
calculated as  
=      T1 + T2     X   100 % 
a 
Where  
T1= Tier 1 capital  
T2 = Tier 2 capital 
A= national regulators minimum total  
Capital requirement  
 
 
Measures risks associated with bank 
capital  
Earnings strength  Calculated as  
=  Bank  loans 
Total assets 
Measure the rate at which money 
knocks the door of banks on average  
Bank strength  Calculated using Banks total assets  
Cash reserve ratio Set by the supervisory authority  
Sensitivity to market risk Measured using the cap[ital asset  
A pricing model (CAPM) functionally 
stated  as:  
Required  retrun = 
Beta (Km –Rf) 
where Km-Rf = 
Risk exposure  
Beta =beta coefficient  
Measures relative risk in the market in 
which banks operate. 
 
 
 
Identification and reduced form of equation  
BL=  aO   +  a1 ES  + a2INCA  + a3 BS  + a4 INCRR +  U1….(1) 
BS = b0 + b1 SEN + b2 AQ +b3BL + U2…. (2)  
From equation ( 2) 
BS = b0 + b1 SEN + b2 AQ +b3 BL + U2…. (2)  
Substitute BL in equation (2) 
BS = b0 + b1 SEN + b2 AQ +b3 ( a0 + a1ES + a2 INCA  + a3 BS  + a4 INCRR +  U1) + U2 
BS =  b0 + b1 SEN + b2 AQ +b3 a0 +  b3 a1ES + a2 b3 INCA  + a3 b3BS  + a4 b3 INCRR +  b3U1) + U2 
Collect like terms  
BS - a3b3BS   =  b0 + b1 SEN + b2 AQ +b3 a0 + b3 a1ES  +  a2 b3 INCA  + a4 b3INCRR +  b3U1 + U2 
BS (1- a3b3) =b0 + b1 SEN + b2 AQ +b3 a0 + b3 a1ES  +  a2 b3 INCA  + a4 b3INCRR +  b3U1 + U2 
BS = (bo/ 1- a3b3) + (b1/ 1- a3b3 )SEN+ (b2/ 1- a3b3)AQ + (aOb3/1- a3b3) +( a1 b2/1- a3b3 )ES+ (a2b3/1- a3b3)INCA+  
(a4b3/1- a3b3)INCRR  +   (b3U1/1- a3b3)+    (U2/1- a3b3) 
From equation (1) 
BL = a0 +  a1, ES + a2INCA +  a3BS +  a4INCRR + U1 ….(1) 
substitute Bs in equation    (1) 
BL=  a0 +  a1ES + a2INCA +   [a3] (b0 + b1 SEN  + b2AQ +b3BL + U2 ) + a4INCRR + U1 ) 
 BL =  a0 +  a1ES + a2INCA +   a3b0 + a3b1 SEN  +a3b2AQ +a3b3BL + a3U2 + a4INCRR + U1 ) 
Collect like term 
BL = a3b3BL + a0 +  a1ES + a2INCA +   a3b0 + a3b1 SEN  +a3b2AQ +a3b3BL + a3U2 + a4INCRR + U1 ) 
BL (1 – a3b3) = a0 +  a1ES + a2INCA +   a3b0 + a3b1 SEN  +a3b2AQ +a3b3BL + a3U2 + a4INCRR + U1 ) 
BL =(a0/1- a3b3)+ (a1/ 1- a3b3)ES    + (a2/1- a3b3 )INCA  + (a3b0/ 1- a3b3)    + (a3b1 /1- a3b3) SEN+  (a3b2/1- a3b3 
)AQ    +(a3U2 /1- a3b3)+(a4/ 1- a3b3 ) INCRR + (U1/1- a3b3 ) 
Putting equation in a more compact form 
BL   = п11   +   п12   + п13ES +   п14 INCA +  п15 SEN +  п16 AQ  п17INCRR  + V1  …..(1) 
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BS = п21 + п22 + п23 ES+ п24INCA + п25SEN + п26AQ + п27INCRR + V2…..(2) 
Where  
п11   =a0/1-a3b п21   = b0/1-a3b3 п12  = a3b0 /1-a3b3 п22  =  a0b3  /1-a3b3 п13  = a1   /1-a3b3 
п23  = a1b2  /1-a3b3 п14  = a2  / 1-a3b3 п24   = a2b3  / 1-a3b3 п15  = a3b2  / 1-a3b3 п25  =  b1  /1-a3b3 
п16  = a3b2 /1-a3b3 п26  = b3 / 1-a3b3 п17  = a4   /1-a3b3 п27  = a4b3  / 1-a3b3 Vi  = disturbances            
V2= disturbances  
Identification of equation  
Identifying the equation is done by order and value equation  
Order condition for identification  
Given as R –r  ≥ g-1 
Where r= number of predetermined variable in the model  
g = number of ingenious   variable  in the ith equation  
n= number of predetermined variables in the ith equation under   
    consideration. 
A = number of actual equation / number of indigenous variable   
Decision rule   ≥ :  over identified  
                       ≤ :   under identified  
                       = :   exactly indentified  
For equation 1: 
BL =  aO   +  a1ES  + a2INCA  + a3 BS  + a4 INCRR +  U1 
         R= 5    G =2     ri= 3        gi =2 
R- r ≥  g-1 
5-3  ≥  2-1  
2  >1 
This necessary not sufficient to conclude that equation is over identified.  
For equation 2 
BS = b0 + b1 SεN + b2 AQ +b3 BL + U2 ….(2)  
R = 5 r  =  2  g = 2  G = 2 
R-r  ≥  g-1  
5-2  ≥  2-1 
3 > 1 
This necessary not sufficient to conclude that equation is over identified. 
Rank order for identification  
Put model in standard form. 
-Bl   +  a1εs  + a2INCA  + a3 BS  + a4 INCRR  0SεN    0AQ  =  -U1 
b3BL +  0εs  +  0INCA -  BS  + 0 INCRR  b1SEN     b2AQ  = -U2 
 
 BL ES  INCA   BS        INCRR SEN AQ 
1 -1 a1   a2   a3    a4  0 0 
2 b3 0   0  -1     0  b1 B2 
Number of determinant to form will be oforder G-1= 2-1 = 1 
For equation 1 
Strive out equation one and strive vertically parameters z of equation one which are non zero i.e 
 
 BL ES  INCA BS INCRR SEN   AQ 
1 -1 a1   a2  a3  a4   0    0 
2 b3  0    0 -1  0   b1    b2 
We have matix [b1b2] given that determinant to be formed is G-1  =1  |b1|≠0 and |b2| ≠ 0 thus equation (1) is over identified. 
For equation 2: 
 BL ES  INCA BS INCRR SEN   AQ 
1 -1 a1   a2  a3  a4   0    0 
2 b3  0    0 -1 0   b1    b2 
We have matrix [a1 a2 a4] given that determinant to be formed isG-1 =1   
[a1]  ≠ 0 [a2] ≠0 and [a4]≠ 0 thus equation (2) is over identified. 
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Figure 1: Trend of Bank liquidity                            Figure 2: Trend of first difference of Bank liquiditY 
 
Figure 3: Trend of Earnings strength                    Figure 4: Trend of first difference of Earnings strength 
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Figure 5: Trend of natural log of Capital protection  Figure 6: Trend of the first difference of Capital 
protection to base e 
 
Figure 7: Trend of Bank strength                       Figure 8: Trend of Cash reserve ratio to base e 
  
Figure 9: Trend of first difference of Cash reserve ratio to base e     Figure 10: Trend of sensitivity to market 
risk 
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Figure 11: Trend of first difference of sensitivity to market riskFigure 12: Trend of Asset quality 
 
Figure 13: Trend of first difference of Asset quality       Figure 14: Trend of second difference of Asset quality 
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